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1 Introduction
The macroeconomic literature on gênerai equilibrinm with monopolistic
compétition has heavily relied on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model. The solu
tion procédure of the latter is known to involve an approximation, in that
each firm is assumed not to perceive the effect of its own price décisions
on the aggregate price index. The implications of this "negligibility hypo-
thesis" hâve recently been discussed in a number of papers (Yang and Hei-
jdra, 1993;Dixit and Stiglitz,1993; D'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and
Gérard-Varet, 1996), the focus of which is on identifying closed solutions
of the model, and determining the equilibrium number of firms. The aim
of this paper is to investigate the rôle of the price-index effect in a gênerai
equilibriurn macroeconomic perspective, with particular emphasis on the
inefficiency of aggregate outcomes.]
It is by now a well established resuit, that gênerai equilibrium inter
actions magnify the partial equilibrium inefficiency of iinperfect compéti
tion, through aggregate demand externalities (e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki,
1987) : since any single firm shares with ail other firms the benefits (in terms
of higlier aggregate demand) of a réduction of its own price, non-cooperative
equilibria arise, which are Pareto-dominated by coopérative outcomes with
higher levels of production and demand. However, when this resuit is ob-
tained within the framework of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic compétition, an
* C. Benassi acknowledges financial support from the University of Bologna
1 The relevance of the price index effect in defining the optimal targets for monetary policy has been sludied
by Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), while the rôle of the price index effect in the analysis of income taxation has
been emphasized by Wu and Zhang (2000).
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additional inefficiency is added to the inefficiency of the Nash solution, due
to firrns neglecting the priée index effect : not only each agent chooses his
price by taking as given the other agents' priées, but lie does not consider
the effect of his own price on the aggregatc price - though the latter enters
the relevant behavioural relations, through both the relative price, and the
real aggregate demand levels.
When the coopération problem is studied in inodels where the price
index approximation is adoptée!, one of the conséquences is that the size
of the macroeconomic inefficiency, and hence the potential incentive to co-
operate, turns ont to be in fact independent of the number of agents - a
resuit which is somewhat disappointing. In this paper, we show that the
explicit considération of the price index effect in the agents' décisions al-
lovvs to specify a correct measure of the inefficiency due to non-cooperative
behaviour, a measure which turns out to be positively correlated to the
number of agents.2 This is consistent with the intuition that in the présence
of aggregate demand externalities, any agent's awareness of the aggregate
implications of his own décisions is stronger, the smaller is the number of
agents.3 In a gênerai equilibrium perspective, a sort of reversai of the Cour-
notion convergence theorem must hold.
Moreover, the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to monopolistic compétition lias
been the theoretical set-up for addressing some basic issues in macroecono
mic (New Keynesian) analysis, such as nominal rigidity and the real effeets
of inonetary policy. One implication of our model is that also the degree
of nominal rigidity and the welfare effeets of nominal shocks dépend on the
number of agents. In the paper we show that the inclusion of the price index
effect reduces the scope for nominal rigidity, and decieases the welfare effect
of monetary shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we sum up a simple
monopolistic compétition macroeconomic model, and compare its standard
Dixit-Stiglitz solution to the non-approximate solution. Section 3 ad dresses
the issue of nominal rigidity and its aggregate implications. Some conclu
sions are gathered in section 4.
2 The consumer-producer model : alternative
solutions
Our référence model is the well known consumer-producer model with mo
nopolistic compétition, introduced by Bail and Romer (1989, 1990) and
2 An alternative channel through which the number of producers (product varieties) influences the macroeco
nomic equilibrium is a direct "préférence for diversity" eHect on utility, studied in Heijdra and van der Ptoeg
(1996) and Heijdra (1998).
3 We recall that the idea that a stronger decision-makers' awareness of their own influence on aggregate
variables générâtes more efficient aggregate outeomes, also inspires, e.g., the debate on centralized vs
decentralized union bargaining (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, ch.2).Corrado Benassi, Alessandra Chirco, Caterina Colombo 387
Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch.8). The economy is populated by N agents,
each of whom is the only producer, by means of his own labour, of a diffe-
rentiated commodity which enters symmetrically the consumption bundle
of ail agents. We recall the basic éléments of this model. The utility function
of any agent i is :
a > 1 (1)
where Lj is labour supplied and Cj is the consumption bundle, defîned by
a CES sub-utility function :
= N 1 A -
.7 = 1
<7> 1
where Qj is the amount of good j consumed by agent i. The production
function is assumed to be linear in labour :
i = U (2)
As a consumer, each agent i maximizes his utility with respect to
ail Cy's. We aggregate individual demand functions over ail agents, and
assume that the transaction technology imposes that (per capita) nominal
money spending equals the (per capita) nominal money stock, M = PC,
where C = (l/N)J2Ci is average consumption. Then the following market
demand for each good j is obtained :
(3)
where P is the dual price index :
P =
3 =
By substituting (2) into (1) and making use of the budget constraint, C,
{Pi/P) Yi, we get the following indirect utility function
This is the objective function which agent i, as a producer, maximizes with
the respect to the nominal price P,: subject to the demand constraint given
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2.1 The approximate solution
The standard solution to tins model neglects the so called "priée index
effect", that is, Pi is chosen under the assumption that P be given, i.e.
unaffected by P,. Under symmetry, tins approximation entails the following
equilibrium values of the aggregate price level P and the level of output
Yj = Y, produced by each agent i :
P = I —O— 1 M
a — 1
Of course, the efficient price-equal-marginal cost rule would entail a higher
output and a lower P :
P = M Y = 1
2.2 The exact solution
Let us consider an alternative solution to the producer's maximization pro-
blem, which is obtained once the effect of P, on the aggregate (average)
price P is taken into account. Maximization of (4) entails the following first
order condition :
where sp = (dP/dPi)/(Pi/P) is the elasticity of the aggregate price index
with respect to P» and ed = {dY?fdPi)f{Pi/Yf) = [cr(l - ep) + £p], from
(3). Consider now the ratio (1 -ep)/sd- The denominator is demand elasti
city; notice that e(i takes hère into account the effects of P» on the relative
price, both directly (<r) and through the price index (asp), as well as on
the real inoney balances (ep).4 The numerator captures the effect of an in-
crease in Pt; on the price of the consumption bundle, which represents for
agent i as a consumer tlie reward for the labour lie supplies. In tins sensé,
the corisumer-producer model accounts neatly for ail gênerai equilibrium
implications of any agent's 'individu al décisions. The ratio (1 -sp)/s(i is
therefore a measure of the desired price rnargin over marginal cost, which
takes into account the effect of an}7 change in the agent's price not only
on his demand, but also on his purchasing power in terms of the overall
consumption bundle. Evaluating thèse elasticities in the symmetric equili
brium, ep = e* = \/N and ed = e*d = er[l - (1/N)] + (1/N), we obtain the
4 Notice that this solution is consistent with the procédure suggested by Yang and Heijdra (1993), which in
ourcase coincides with thatproposed by D'Aspremont étal. (1996).Corrado Benassi, Alessandra Chirco, Caterina Colombo 389
equilibrium values of P ancl Y :
M
v<»-i)(i-*)+*;
For any finite value of TV, including the price index effect implies a higher
equilibrium level of Y and a lower P, with respect to the model's standard
solution. More precisery, it is easy to check that we recover the efficient
solution for TV approaching 1, and the standard solution as N approaches
infinity. Although thèse convergence properties are clearly not unexpected,
they carry with thein some noteworthy implications.
Following a standard practice, we can characterize the macroeconomic
inefficiency associated with monopolistic compétition in ternis of the output
gap between the equilibrium and the efficient solutions. In the (standard)
approximate solution, this gap is actually independent of N. This is so-
mehow unsatisfactory, as one would expect that an inefficiency driven by
demand-externality should dépend on the agents' ability to perceive the
gênerai equilibrium implications of their choices - something which is in
principle related to the number of agents. However, the approximate solu
tion fails to convey this important point, since there the inefficiency results
from the combined effect of (a) the non-cooperative behaviorir implied by
the decentralized décision making, and (b) the myopie behaviour implitit in
disregarding the price index effect. Once the latter is arnended for, the inef
ficiency due purely to lack of coopération is fully brought out as positively
related to the number of agents.
3 The price index effect and nominal rigidity
As is well known. the aggregate inefficiency generated by optimal individual
choices is the key property, which made the model sketched above a most
appropriate framework for the study of nominal rigidities. Since both the
individual pricing rule and the degree of aggregate inefficiency are affectée!
by the price index effect, the private incentive towards inertial behaviour
and its macroeconomic conséquences should be re-assessed in the light of
this effect - as also should the possibility that both rigidity and flexibility
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3.1 Private loss, welfare and nominal rigidity
Small monetary shocks entail no private loss from nominal inertia, while the
aggregate equilibrium being sub-optimal implies that this inertia lias first
order effects on aggregate variables. By applying the définition of social gain
(loss) from non adjustment (as a proportion of the initial output), dV/Y =
{dV/dM) dM/Y evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain for the
non approximate solution :
dV _ (l-*) dM \-e%dM
Y ,7(1-*) + * M - e'd ~M (6)
the coefficient of which is lower than 1/a and collapses to it as N tends to
infinity. As expected, the measure of the welfare gain (loss) of nominal iner
tia is given by the degree of monopoly power, which in our case lias already
been shown to be lower than in the approximate case. In the présence of
nominal rigidity, our flexible solution being closer to the efficient one makes
aggregate welfare less sensitive to nominal disturbances.
Large shocks require an explicit évaluation of the private loss C from
non adjustment, to be comparai with the menu cost.5 Recall that, when
measured in terms of the initial output, C evaluated by a second order ïaylor
expansion is - [(SPV/dMdPi)2 /2 {d2V/dP?)\ (dM)2 /Y. This in our case
becomes :
where
H =H(tt,<T,N) = cr(l + aa)-^- {2a(a - 1) + a + 1)
Notice that the coefficient of \{dM/M)2 in C tends to its standard
(approxiriiate solution) ralue [(a - l)(a - l)2/(a<r - a + 1)] as AT tends to
infinity. To compare C with the latter for différent values of N, we assign
to a and a the benchmark values suggested by Dixon and Hansen (1999),
a = 6 and a — 4, in which case the approximate value of the coefficient is
3.5714. The convergence to this value is plotted in Figure 1.
The intuition for the private loss to be Systematically higher under
the exact solution is the following. By non-adjusting priées agents give up
5 The procedu re for the évaluation of the private loss from inertial behaviour and its aggregate conséquences




not only the opportunity of changing their desired relative price directly,
but also the possibility of counteractiiig (via their own price change) the
aggregate shock they perceive in real money balances, given the inertial
behaviour of ail other agents. Therefore, a full awareness of the aggregate
implications of individual décisions narrows the scope for rigidity to be an
equilibrium solution of the model : the size of the menu cost required to
induce inertia is higher, the lower is the number of price-making agents.
The social gain (loss) from large monetary shocks under price rigidity,





\ M ) (7)
The coefficient of first order term coincide with (6) ; therefore it is lower than
in the standard case, and is increasing in Ar;the coefficient of the second
order term is higher than its approximate counterpart, and is decreasing
in N. By applying to (7) the same parameter values considered above, the
overall effect of a positive shock on M is a social gain, which is in fact
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3.2 Multiplicity of equilibria
As Bail and Romer (1991) point out, tho présence of menu cost may be
consistent with both price rigidity and price flexibility being Nash equilibria.
For tins multiplicity resuit to émerge, the size of the menu cost must be
greater than the private loss from non adjustment when ail other agents do
not adjust, and smaller than the private loss from non adjustment when ail
other agent do adjust their priées. In section 3.1 we hâve shown that for
reasonable parameter values, the private loss from non adjustment in the
first case is higher hère than in the standard case. As for the private loss
from rigidity when the other agents adjust, tins is now :
For the same parameter values, this expression is lower than its approximate
équivalent, to which it converges from below as N tends to infinity. Again, it
is not difficult to capture the économie intuition of this behaviour. Any agent
is now aware of his rôle in defining the aggregate price; therefore lie perceives
that adjustment from ail other agents does not imply full adjustment of the
aggregate price and real money balances. This makes for him less costly to
refrain from changing his own price, when ail other agents do change theirs.
As a conséquence, the range of menu cost values which support mul-
tiplicity of equilibria. (sticky and flexible priées) shrinks - a resuit which, in
the spirit of Bail and Romer, can be interpreted as a réduction of the scope
for coordination failures.
4 Concluding remarks
The idea that imperfect compétition makes for lower activity levels
lias of course been kiiown for a long time;the New Keynesian literature
highlighted that gênerai equilibrium interactions niagnify this inemeiency,
and offered an interprétation of the latter in ternis of endogenous insufîicient
aggregate demand. Within this framework, this paper deals with the follo-
wing question : is the efficiency gap driven by imperfect compétition larger,
when few agents are endowed with market power, or rather is it larger when
market power is widely spread across traders ? More generally, how does the
number of décision makers affect the incentive to internalize macroeconomic
externalities ?
The standard référence model on aggregate demand externality - the
Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic compétition - yields the disappointing
resuit that the number of interacting agents is immateiïal. In tins paper we
hâve shown that this is due to the Dixit-Stiglitz approximation neglecting
the so-called price-index effect. Once the latter is allowed for, the macroe
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of agents. Moreover, including the price-index effect narrows the scope for
New Keynesian outcomes, such as optimal nominal rigidity and multiplicity
of (flexible vs inertial) equilibria.
We believe that thèse resuit, though simple, may provide some useful
insights. On the one hand, from a normative perspective, one should expect
the aggregate size of policy measures based on externality-internalizing me-
chanisms (e.g., Agell and Dillén, 1994) to be smaller, the smaller the number
of agents. On the other hand, reasoning along the theoretical Unes sugges-
ted in the paper may offer some perspective on the rnuch debated problem
of high unemployment in Europe. It is well known that many European
countries hâve historically experienced a corporatist structure of économie
relations, which brings about a widely spread, rent generating market power.
Though at a very high level of generality, the paper may give some theore
tical support to the idea that this peculiar structure of économie relations
is likely to amplify the négative macroeconomic extemalities of rent-seeking
behaviour.
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